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AND YOU THOUGHT YOU
WEREN’T BRINGING ANY
BAGGAGE TO YOUR
MARRIAGE
BRYAN HARPER
From an economic standpoint, marriage is inherently efficient, and divorce
is inherently inefficient. Divorce economics point to human capital as a
possible solution. Yet human capital is unconstitutional and irrational in
the context of divorce. Love and affection are the only foundations for an
efficient marriage.

M

arriage is a legal relationship, but it is a personal, physical,
and often religious relationship as well. Regulating or legally
defining such a relationship is invasive, difficult, and easily
discriminatory.1 This article will discuss the ideas of marriage, divorce,
and their problems and resolutions primarily from an economic standpoint. Starting with the notion that marriage can be looked at in terms
of economics leads to two different versions of an “economically
efficient” marriage. Divorce scenarios result in economically inefficient
and unfair burdens, the majority of which are borne by women and
children. For economists, human capital could represent one potential
solution to the problems of divorce. Unfortunately, as this article will
argue, the properties of human capital render it both unconstitutional
and economically inefficient in divorce, based on economists’ own
efficiency measurements. This leaves us to examine things more basic
to the marriage and divorce problem, such as the reasons we marry in
the first place.
According to Ann Laquer Estin, “Economists argue that their
analytical tools are appropriate to the family as well as the market because in both settings individuals make choices in a context of scarce
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resources.”2 Gary Becker, noted family behavioralist, amplifies these
economic principles:
When men and women decide to marry, or have children, or divorce, they attempt to raise their welfare by comparing benefits and
costs. So they marry when they expect to be better off than if they
remain single, and they divorce if that is expected to increase their
welfare.3

Becker’s theory, sometimes referred to as the “new home economics,”
depicts a household as a firm that combines the resources available to
it—the time of household members and various market goods—to
produce the desired outputs or commodities it desires.4
There seem to be two different notions of an economically efficient
marriage. The first may be classified as the traditional or 1950s marriage, while the second represents the present-day, less rigid form
of marriage. A closer examination of these will allow an explanation of
marital economic efficiency.
Specific gender roles characterized marriage in the 1950s. In the
“Leave it to Beaver” model, Ward Cleaver leaves the home to work and
provide for the family. The model assumes he is best suited for the
workplace. June Cleaver, on the other hand, stays home with the children, makes a mean apple pie, and repairs scrapes and cuts in a traditionally feminine manner. Economists use comparative advantage in
production of children and other household commodities to explain
these roles. This “specialization and division of labor” implies that one
spouse must choose the household and the other must choose the
marketplace.5 This theory assumes that women, by virtue of their
biology, possess a “natural comparative advantage over men in the
household, as opposed to market production and that men enjoyed a
correspondingly natural comparative advantage.”6
Conversely, the present ideal might best be characterized by a less
rigid understanding of traditional gender roles. “Margaret Brinig . . .
has suggested that the standard [historically based] economic account
fails to consider important psychological costs associated with specialization.”7 These refer to things such as women who would like to be
working, men who would like to work less, either spouse spending

Harper: Baggage

/ 49

more or less time with the children, and so forth.8 Perhaps then, “an
efficient union would entail both partners having significant ties to the
paid labor force and spending significant time with their children.”9 All
facets of married life can thus be enjoyed by both partners in amounts
they so desire. Key to this ideal is individual choice, its importance in
the family, and its subsequent constitutional efficiency. Present-day
ideals seem to embrace an individual’s right to choose while recognizing
that men and women may desire something other than historical gender roles.
The Supreme Court has upheld individuality within the bounds of
marriage. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court concluded that couples
have a constitutional right to obtain and use contraception.10 Justice
Goldberg’s opinion “emphasized also the personal liberty guaranteed by
the Constitution that allows individuals within a marriage to make
choices about family planning.”11 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Supreme
Court asserted that “it is the right of the individual, married or single
to be free from the unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person . . . as to whether to bear children.”12
And in Roe v. Wade the Court noted that “women have certain individual privacy rights that may be expressed by terminating a pregnancy.”13
These three decisions have reasserted a “jurisprudence of decisional
autonomy that extends to the individual within a marriage.”14 Parenthood is a choice specific to the wills of either spouse. No longer do the
courts seem reluctant to acknowledge the individual right to choose
different paths in a marriage. These examples will be referred to later in
this article.
Having discussed marriage and its subsequent efficiency in these
two scenarios, it seems natural to continue with a discussion of divorce.
First, however, a presentation of the present divorce model’s effects on
women seems appropriate.
According to a recent California study, the standard of living for
women after divorce decreased by seventy-three percent, while the standard of living for men actually increased by forty-two percent.15 In
addition, financial awards to women at the time of divorce seem to
greatly devalue their marital contributions. In studying divorce,
Katharine Baker and Lenore Weitzman note this economic disparity at
divorce: divorce proceedings undeniably benefit the husband.16
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One response to this apparent economic injustice during divorce is
joint ownership of human capital. Human capital is defined as “the
investment of time and money in self development to enhance skills
and abilities, which are a source and form of wealth.”17 Economists
assert that human capital and any wealth generated by it may be
shared, similar to other marital properties, by divorced spouses in
amounts corresponding to their needs.
To determine how to divide human capital, economists examine a
woman’s contribution to the marriage and any increase to human
capital regardless of whether she worked outside the home. All marital
assets, human capital included, are pooled in divorce and split based
upon need. This practice exposes a “need” to call it jointly owned.
Charles Reich summarized one scenario of human capital in his 1990
article “The New Property after 25 Years.” He puts forth an example of
a husband and wife who have no resources at the time of divorce except
the husband’s professional degree. He further expands this scenario by
outlining the wife’s choices to further her husband’s goal of obtaining
this degree. These choices include foregoing her own education and
subsequent career, working to pay expenses, and reducing her own
standard of living for a period of time. He argues that it is unjust not to
calculate this form of “property” in divorce settlements.18
Furthermore, women consistently bear the majority of the costs and
labor associated with child rearing or “household production,” complicating the divorce scenario. Regardless of her reduced ability, a woman is
expected to earn and provide “without financial transfers from her husband.”19 The assumption is that if she is granted joint ownership of her
husband’s human capital her ability to provide would not be as reduced.
Hence, her burden at the time of divorce would be more fair.
Yet there are complications in the designation of human capital as
a jointly ownable resource. First, the Thirteenth Amendment and a
discussion of the philosophical ideas of personhood and self-constitution
leads to an examination of how joint ownership undermines present-day
constitutional efficiency within marriage, as is evident from the three
Supreme Court decisions cited above. Additionally, Kaldor-Hicks and
Pareto economic efficiency norms function at the time of marriage, but
erect barriers to a joint ownership mandate at the time
of divorce.

Harper: Baggage

/ 51

In Severs v. Severs, the Court ruled that the Thirteenth Amendment
prohibits a husband from paying his wife a portion of the value of his
license or degree, since it could subject the husband to involuntary
servitude.20 If enhanced earning capacity were considered property, the
husband would be locked into his current career, thus negating his right
to choice. “[The Court] opines that it would be unfair to force the husband to remain in a career he does not like, or to continue paying based
upon the value of that career.”21 In United States v. Kozminiski, the
Court limited involuntary servitude to actual physical or legal coercion.22 A court’s decision in favor of joint ownership of human capital
would be understood as “legal coercion” and, hence, unconstitutional.
Margaret Radin comments on this situation in her article “Reinterpreting Property”:
To make the degree holding spouse . . . compensate his former
spouse for the development of his own abilities is problematic for his
personhood too. He is at least (symbolically) locked into the career
projected at the time of divorce, and indeed locked into the marriage
itself in a sense. . . . He is locked for life into the career he chose during marriage, because his ex-wife shares forever the self he was then.
That perhaps is too much entrenchment in context to be consistent
with personhood as we now conceive it.23

Economic efficiency norms, tests which determine whether or not
an action is economically efficient, are central to both economics and
law with regard to marriage and divorce. As the aforementioned marital
ideals are rooted in this theory, it seems only appropriate to ensure that
divorce maintains an equal level of efficiency.
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency norms, or predetermined values for material or nonmaterial concepts, seem to make the marital contract enforceable.24 They require that divorce be handled in a manner akin to tort
law, using liability rules that define marriage entitlements financially.25
Under Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, all aspects of marriage would be given a
value and, at the time of divorce, payment would be calculated based
on predetermined values.
The daunting nature of the Kaldor-Hicks endeavor is obvious.
It is difficult to accurately and fairly value all aspects of the marital
union. Moreover, if ever accomplished, Kaldor-Hicks divorce efficiency
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represents a definite and undeniably heavy judicial presence in divorce
proceedings. Most legal and economic theorists agree that this is most
certainly not an efficient use of the social property inherent in the
judicial system.26 Notwithstanding, placing a value on human capital
and assuming its ability to be split or jointly owned denies the previous
paragraphs’ suppositions of the importance of individual autonomy
and the rights inherent in the Thirteenth Amendment.
Pareto efficiency is achieved exclusive of any defining body. It is the
result, when applied to divorce, of “husbands and wives [behaving] as
rational, self-interested bargainers [who] will avoid arrangements that
entail serious financial risks.”27 Central here is the idea of rationality in
divorce proceedings.
Deeply felt emotions seem to negate any rationality and necessitate
third party negotiations during divorce settlements. Even more, human
capital is still seen as individual property: “Law students, both male
and female, married and single, tend to regard their . . . law degrees as
uniquely the product of their own talents and labors, both before
and during law school.”28 This only supports the supposition that a
“rational” divorce is an oxymoron, something impossible, especially
where human capital is concerned.
So it seems that we are inevitably caught between a rock and a hard
place. Though marriage has the potential for economical efficiency, it
can also result in divorce, which is economically inefficient. We are left
with little to support the idea of marriage, let alone entering into it before completion of our own human capitalistic endeavors, if only in an
effort to potentially reduce future divorce complications. Strict calculation of efficiency provides little incentives for marriage.
Most couples do marry “because they love each other and want to
spend the rest of their lives together.”29 Marriage, divorce, and human
capital issues could be defined, discussed, and dealt with in an easier
manner if couples heeded Margaret Brinig’s advice: “Not business or
money, but wedlock is what the parties [should] contemplate. They are,
or should be, motivated by love and affection to form a mutual and
voluntary compact to live together as husband and wife, until separation by death, for the purpose of mutual happiness, establishing a
family, the continuance of the race, the propagation of children, and
the general good of society.”30
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